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13 December 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR POLICY COORDINATION
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Status of TRD

1. The current reorganization plan for CIA raises the possibility that TRD will be removed from the direction and control of the two covert offices and made a part of CIA administrative services. It is felt that such a step would be unreal in refusing to recognize training for these offices as an operational support. It is further felt that the move would be detrimental to OSO and OPC in that it would reduce the effectiveness of training for their operations.

2. Experience has demonstrated that training is more effective when close to operations. In fact, the improvement in training which has been generally recognized is due in no small measure to the close relations currently existing between TRD and the covert offices and to the policy guidance and operational direction which those offices are thus able to effect.

3. From the standpoint of TRD generally the move would be unwise for the following principal reasons:

a. Operational security would be weakened by exposing current and projected OSO and OPC operations to persons other than those who need to know.

b. Operational effectiveness of TRD would be reduced because

(1) the constant flow of information regarding recent and current operational experience would cease or be considerably curtailed;

(2) the existing policy of rotating instructor personnel and returning field officers on a regular basis would be impracticable;

(3) the release

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(3) the release to TRD of highly sensitive operational files and case histories would in all probability cease;

(4) TRD would encounter great reluctance on the part of the two covert offices to discuss general or specific operational plans;

(5) TRD would gradually cease to be a central repository of operational techniques and information and would be unable to develop acceptable operational doctrine; and

(6) participation in the training program by specialists and operations officers from the covert offices would be greatly reduced.

All the above would tend to make the training programs for covert operations static and thus reduce their effectiveness.

c. Many training activities, such as CE instruction, special training projects, and the sending of training materials or instructors overseas, require clearance through Staff C/OSO. Existing close working relations with the covert offices are essential for the efficient performance of these activities.

d. The thorough debriefing of all returning operations officers by TRD is one of the most effective means of testing the validity of training and of securing the benefits of the freshest experience in covert operations. Such returnees would be reluctant to reveal operational techniques to other than covert offices personnel.

4. The above considerations apply to all TRD activities. However, the operational effectiveness of the individual TRD branches and staffs would be affected in the following specific respects:

a. Staff Training Branch. This Branch is responsible for training OSO and OPC staff personnel. Obviously, close direction and guidance from the two covert offices and direct access to the operating desks is essential. Any impediment to such close relations and access will prove detrimental to the training.

b. Area Training Branch. This Branch is responsible for paramilitary training of OPC field personnel. OPC takes a direct interest in, and furnishes guidance for, this training. Direct relations are essential for operational security and effective training.

c. Covert

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d. Records and Evaluation Staff. This Staff develops evaluation and testing methods for TRD and performs studies to determine the soundness of training. Such research must necessarily include criteria of validity determined through intimate coordination with OSO and OPC. Evaluation of general operational qualifications of personnel in training can be valid only if based on a flexible and currently practical training program, and this requires the closest coordination with operations. In addition, the very much needed program of re-appraising the qualifications and long-term capabilities of operations officers in the light of their training and field performance, and of applying the resultant conclusions, will be possible and effective only through the closest cooperation between TRD and the covert offices.

e. Training Materials Staff. This Staff is responsible for instructional support, including graphic aids, intelligence materials and library service. It maintains direct contact with the support and operating staffs of OSO and OPC for the procurement and coordination of training materials and doctrine. The imposition of several levels of administration between TMS and its sources would complicate its support functions and slow its procurement.

f. Assessment Staff. This Staff performs psychological assessment of operational personnel. Since assessment can only be made in relation to the individual's projected assignment, it can be valid only when the needs, objectives and experience of the operational divisions are readily available.

g. Special

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g. Special Projects Staff. This Staff is responsible for planning special projects to meet unusual training requirements of OSO and OPC. In all cases special projects training constitutes an integral part of a specific operation and a classification of Top Secret is generally involved. In many cases, such as those involving officials of foreign intelligence services, the training itself becomes a covert operation of an extremely sensitive and delicate nature. The satisfactory fulfillment of these special training requirements would be made difficult if not impossible should TRD be removed from the control of the covert offices and designated an administrative service.

5. It is felt that the above considerations make it clear that training for covert operations will be most realistic and effective only if treated as an integral part of such operations. In the position of an administrative service, such training cannot fulfill its true function of operational support.

6. Therefore, it is strongly recommended as imperative that TRD continue under the control of OSO and OPC for policy guidance and operational direction.

[Redacted]

Chief, TRD

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

NO.

40690

DATE

15 December 1950

TRD,

TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. CS II/OPC	2030 K		28 Jan	EJS	It is requested that the attached memorandum be called to the attention of ADSO and ADPC respectively for their review and consideration. It is further recommended, following the review by ADSO and ADPC, that a joint meeting between those individuals and Chief, TRD be held to explore this matter in greater detail. MRP WRP
2. TRD		29 Jan			
3.					
4.					
5.					1 to 2: Concur completely in P 6 (and so does ADPC) but believe it is necessary for us to develop a sound plan for accomplishing our objectives within the letter & spirit of DCI's policies. I happen to believe that this <u>can</u> be done. — EJS
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